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NO. 22 MAY 2018 Introduction 
Secession or Solidarity 
Catalonia Will Not Get Both Simultaneously 
Sabine Riedel 
Since the arrest of the former head of the Catalan government, Carles Puigdemont, 
a solidarity movement has emerged that paints him as a victim of the justice sys-
tem. However, even if the German government prevents his extradition this is 
hardly likely to influence the trials against his colleagues remanded in custody in 
Madrid. The Spanish public prosecutor’s office accuses them not only of rebellion, 
but also of embezzling money from the autonomous communities’ liquidity fund 
(FLA) for their independence campaign. Since the 2012 financial crisis, Madrid has 
had to subsidise heavily indebted regions, including Catalonia, with loans. Barce-
lona annually receives between 6.7 billion (2012) and 11.1 billion euros (2015). This 
financial dependence motivates Catalans to bid for independence, in the expecta-
tion that it will lead to direct access to the European Central Bank (ECB). Europeans 
need to reflect on who should be given their solidarity. A Catalan state would be 
born with a mountain of debt, which the other Spanish regions and the European 
taxpayer would ultimately have to shoulder. 
 
On 27 October 2017, the Spanish central 
government suspended Catalonia’s autono-
my under article 155 of the Spanish consti-
tution. Even Madrid knew that the conflict 
over secession would not be resolved via 
this measure. Instead, new elections were 
supposed to give all participants the chance 
to save face and re-engage in dialogue. 
On 10 October 2017, Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy had already agreed to ap-
point a commission, as proposed by the So-
cialist leader Pedro Sánchez, to draw up a 
concept for modifying the Spanish system 
of autonomy. Among Spain’s 17 so-called 
autonomous communities, several others 
also wish for more financial self-administra-
tion. 
Madrid’s offer may have come relatively 
late, but it was an olive branch nonetheless. 
Carles Puigdemont and his deposed regional 
government have still not grasped it. In-
stead they signed Catalonia’s declaration 
of independence on the very same day to 
demonstrate that the only thing they were 
willing to negotiate was statehood. From 
their perspective, all bridges connecting 
them to central government had already 
been destroyed; negotiations could only 
tackle the terms and conditions of seces-
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sion. These talks are supposed to quickly di-
vide up an economic area that has coa-
lesced over centuries. 
Puigdemont in European “Exile” 
Thus far, the Catalan regional government 
lacks both the necessary legal basis and the 
democratic legitimacy to secede. It relies ex-
clusively on its sense of justice and the 
vague conviction that Europe predominantly 
considers its movement for independence 
justified. The EU institutions’ silence in the 
run-up to the controversial referendum on 
1 October 2017 could, indeed, be interpreted 
as covert solidarity. European Council Presi-
dent Donald Tusk did not address the Cata-
lan parliament until ten days later, on 
the day that Catalonia’s declaration of inde-
pendence was signed. However, he then 
called on its members to drop their plans 
and instead seek a constitutional solution 
through dialogue with Madrid. 
It seemed as if this plain speaking gave 
the Catalan Premier Puigdemont pause for 
thought. He hesitated before finally declar-
ing independence, knowing perfectly well 
what legal consequences were looming at 
the European level: by seceding from Spain, 
Catalonia would inevitably also leave the 
EU. This is why, to date, the separatists 
have still not implemented their declara-
tion of independence. Behind their inaction 
lies a strategy to bring the crisis to a head, 
so as to obtain a special status for Catalonia 
from the EU. They want Brussels to accept 
the secession without their newly-created 
state having to leave the Union. This ex-
plains why Madrid never received a reply 
from the Catalan leadership to its question 
of whether independence was actually go-
ing to be put into effect or not. After 17 
days, the Spanish government ended the 
uncertainty by rescinding autonomy tempo-
rarily and by suspending the regional gov-
ernment. 
Puigdemont escaped arrest by fleeing 
the country for Belgium with several of his 
ministers. The only politicians to welcome 
the escapees with open arms were from 
the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA). They too 
strive for independence for their (Belgian) 
region of Flanders. However, their appar-
ently spontaneous solidarity with the Cata-
lan separatists is based on many years of co-
operation. The N-VA is part of a Europe-
wide network of separatist parties which in-
cludes the Republican Left of Catalonia 
(ERC) – the party of the imprisoned for-
mer finance and economy minister Oriol 
Junqueras – and which calls itself the Eu-
ropean Free Alliance (EFA). It currently has 
11 MEPs in the European Parliament. 
The EFA’s members of parliament have 
not only granted Puigdemont and his min-
isters “asylum” since late October 2017; 
from Brussels they have also organised re-
sistance to his removal from office. Their 
rhetoric tries to shake the European pub-
lic’s confidence in the Spanish justice sys-
tem. They describe Spain as a “neo-Fran-
coist” system and demand that it be ex-
cluded from the EU (EFA, 1 October 2017) or 
talk of “Erdoganisation” (EFA, 24 March 
2018), ascribing to Mariano Rajoy and his 
minority government a breadth of powers 
equal to the Turkish president’s, and draw-
ing parallels with the latter’s policy towards 
the Kurds. The EFA chairman, the Corsican 
François Alfonsi, has demanded an EU in-
tervention, calling on the European Council 
to stop ongoing proceedings against the de-
tained Catalan politicians immediately be-
cause they are “political prisoners”. In other 
words, he wants precisely what he accuses 
his opponents of: political influence over 
ongoing lawsuits, despite the fact that only 
independent judges can verify the charges. 
If Spain had remained a dictatorship af-
ter Franco’s death in 1975, there would 
have been no early parliamentary elections 
in Catalonia. The Spanish government even 
allowed the imprisoned and exiled politi-
cians to stand for re-election as frontrunners 
despite the fact that they had not dropped 
their unconstitutional bid for Catalonia’s 
secession. On election night (21 December 
2017), they were able to portray this as a 
victory. In fact, the separatist camp lost 
two seats. The hardliners from the Popular 
Unity Candidacy (Cat. Candidatura d’Unitat 
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Popular, CUP), an anarchist-nationalist party, 
even forfeited six of their ten seats. The 
real winners that evening were Cuidadanos/ 
Cuitadans (The Citizens – Party of the Citi-
zenry). Their 36 members of parliament 
fight for Catalonia to remain part of Spain 
and to reform the autonomy system (Riedel 
2018, p. 1). 
The CUP Remains the Kingmaker 
Nevertheless, the CUP’s remaining four 
members in the regional parliament con-
tinue to be kingmakers. In early 2016 
the CUP’s parliamentarians had already en-
sured that Puigdemont replaced Artur Mas 
as premier. They have remained faithful to 
their idol to this day, and are determined to 
reinstate him as head of government. Once 
it became known in early February 2018 
that Puigdemont could not be elected in ab-
sentia, the CUP successfully prevented the 
election of compromise candidates from 
Puigdemont’s own party, JxCat (Cat. Junts 
per Catalunya, Together for Catalonia): 
first Elsa Atardi, the party’s spokeswoman, 
and then Jordi Turull, spokesman of the de-
posed regional government. 
The CUP’s decision not to support Jordi 
Turull in the initial vote on 22 March 2018 
was at first hard to understand: like Puig-
demont, Turull is one of the accused mem-
bers of the independence movement. His 
arrest shortly after the voting defeat, almost 
straight out of parliament, further fanned 
the flames of the Catalan victim myth. 
However, the CUP did not wish to provide 
the central government with an opportunity 
for immediately dissolving the regional par-
liament if Turull was elected. It seemed to 
be boycotting the formation of a govern-
ment as part of a delaying tactic: the vote 
triggered a legal waiting period of 60 days. 
Only then can new elections be called – if 
no new regional premier has been elected 
in the meantime. 
While Turull was being remanded in cus-
tody, the examining magistrate of the Span-
ish Supreme Court, Pablo Llarena, is-
sued European arrest warrants for six for-
mer members of the Catalan government – 
including Carles Puigdemont – who were 
in Belgium, the UK and Switzerland. The 
move thwarted the CUP’s plans to create a 
“Council of the Republic” (Consell de la 
República in Catalan) as a “government in 
exile” (CUP 28 February 2018). The plan was 
for Puigdemont as Catalan premier to con-
tinue promoting the independence project 
from the Belgian municipality of Waterloo, 
a suburb of Brussels. 
Puigdemont Pulls the Strings 
in Berlin 
Given that Puigdemont was arrested at the 
Danish-German border on 25 March 2018, 
he had to change his plans and prepared 
himself for possible new elections from Ber-
lin, not Brussels. In a first clue, immedi-
ately after he was released from Neumün-
ster prison, he called on his allies in Barce-
lona to make Jordi Sànchez the new 
premier. This appeal could not be taken se-
riously: Sànchez is also in custody. Moreo-
ver, this former president of the Catalan Na-
tional Assembly or ANC (Assemblea Nacional 
Catalana in Catalan) is the ideological leader 
and organiser of the independence move-
ment. His nomination had to be interpreted 
as a further provocation aimed at Madrid 
and an attempt to delay new elections. 
Germany would certainly be better suited 
as a political stage than Belgium. In Brus-
sels, the Flemish allies of the Catalan sepa-
ratists, the N-VA, are currently the biggest 
parliamentary party and under great pres-
sure. The multi-party coalition led by the 
N-VA could collapse if the party openly sup-
ported the Catalan demands for independ-
ence, tipping the country into a govern-
mental crisis. In Germany, by contrast, the 
parties of the EFA network historically have 
hardly any influence: the Bavaria Party, the 
Frisians and the South Schleswig Voters’ As-
sociation (SSW) all cannot pass the 5% 
threshold to obtain representation in the re-
gional parliaments. They are represented 
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only because of exception clauses. Their de-
mands for statehood, whether made openly 
or covertly (Bavaria Party, 3 October 2017), 
are either not noticed or judged to be irrele-
vant. After all, German federalism already 
grants the regions and local authorities ex-
tensive rights of self-government. 
On the other hand, this means that the 
German public attaches significant weight 
to regional self-administration and is 
touchy about solo efforts by federal or state 
governments. Nevertheless, this does not 
explain the broad sympathy for the Catalan 
separatists that is apparent in the media. 
Alongside the Basques, Catalans already 
have more autonomy than any other region 
in Spain – the myth of Spanish hegemony 
cannot be substantiated by references to 
Catalonia’s statute of autonomy. Rather it 
arises out of hostility to the state itself. The 
institutions of the central state in particular 
are viewed not as legitimate but as instru-
ments of oppression. 
This is what the CUP means when it re-
fers to the “national and social liberation of 
the Catalan countries” (CUP 2018). It posits 
as uncontroversial the status of Catalonia as 
a separate nation and contrasts it with 
Spain’s existing nation-state and regional 
structures. This argument is also used by 
Quim Torra, who, on Puigdemont’s sugges-
tion, was elected Regional President on 14 
May. He likewise claims that Catalonia is 
oppressed and financially extorted by the 
Spanish state (The Telegraph, 11 May 2018). 
In his parliamentary speech, he promised to 
push ahead with the secessionist agenda: “A 
Catalan republic means looking towards Eu-
rope” (El País, 14 May 2018). 
Quim Torra sees his role as being strictly 
an interim president for as long as Puig-
demont cannot be selected in absentia – it 
will take months before the Constitutional 
Court examines the Catalan Law of 4 May, 
which should pave the way for his election. 
Meanwhile, Torra has proclaimed that he 
plans to establish a constituent assembly 
to write the constitution for a new Catalan 
republic and to "create a state council in ex-
ile", obviously in Berlin. These statements 
reinforce the suspicions of the opposition 
leader in the Catalan parliament, Inés Arri-
madas of Cuitadanos, that Torra might only 
be a Puigdemont puppet. 
A “Judicialisation” of the Conflict? 
Contrary to the allegations made by the sep-
aratists, there are no such fundamental cul-
tural and social differences between the au-
tonomous communities of Spain: Catalonia 
has been self-administered for about 40 
years. Its regional government already bears 
the majority of the responsibility for the so-
cial and economic development of Catalo-
nia, even where cutbacks are concerned. 
Since 2012, the year of the Spanish crisis, 
Catalan finance and economy ministers 
have had to slash expenses. Thus Oriol Jun-
queras of the Republican Left (ERC) ex-
plained at a recent business congress that 
the regional government had made cuts to-
talling 3.91 billion euros, a record within 
Spain (Ara, 30 May 2017). 
Because the three allied separatist parties 
represent the entire political spectrum, they 
find it difficult to criticise the central gov-
ernment in specific policy areas, such as fi-
nancial policy. Consequently, the separat-
ists’ demands for independence contain 
hardly any factual arguments. Instead, the 
defenders of statehood emphasise the politi-
cal “legitimacy” of their regional govern-
ment. Opposing them, Madrid will not be 
swayed from its course of keeping separa-
tism at bay by all legal means. It thus insists 
on the “legality” of political decisions taken 
within the framework of the current consti-
tution. This explains in part why the con-
flict over secession has shifted from the po-
litical to the legal level. Since this shift 
plays into the hands of those who want to 
preserve the nation state, the separatist par-
ties deplore the “judicialisation of politics” 
(“judicialización de la política”, La Vanguar-
dia, 18 October 2016). 
Their criticism obfuscates the fact that 
the independence movement has also re-
sorted to “judicialisation”. The start of this 
strategy can be traced back to the former 
Catalan Premier Artur Mas. In the autumn 
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of 2012, Mas dissolved the regional parlia-
ment early in order to turn the elections 
thereby triggered into a plebiscite. He 
promised to lead Catalonia into independ-
ence by 2020. In early 2013, after re-elec-
tion, he founded a 15-strong legal council, 
the CATN (Consell Assessor per a la Transició 
Nacional in Catalan), whose task it was to 
prepare the transferral of central-govern-
ment competences to the region. This 
aimed to create a legal framework for the 
envisaged referendum on independence, 
but it failed. As a consequence, the vote of 
9 November 2014, declared unconstitutional, 
was re-categorised into a non-binding popu-
lar vote (Riedel 2014, p. 11). 
When Carles Puigdemont was elected 
premier in early 2016, he continued his 
predecessor’s strategy. His declared objec-
tive was now to use the region’s legislative 
competence to create parallel structures for 
a quasi-state. In an interview, Puigdemont 
explained (Die Welt, 5 June 2016): 
“We have emancipated ourselves from 
Spain and make our own laws. We are 
currently building the structures for the 
new state because we need legal security, 
we need to take into consideration inter-
national treaties, meaning over 3,000 
agreements are valid for us also.” 
The plan was eventually to pass “dissocia-
tion laws”, on the basis of which new struc-
tures – for example Catalonia’s own social-
security system and foreign ministry – 
would be created. Since the governing coali-
tion has such a small majority, this re-
quired a change in the standing orders 
of the Catalan parliament. 
Since that parliamentary reform was 
passed on 6 April 2017, the regional govern-
ment has been able to push through 
its draft bills in only one reading. The oppo-
sition has in effect been neutralised (EiTB, 
26 April 2017), and now has to rely on the 
support of Spain’s Constitutional Court to 
defend its democratic right to co-determina-
tion. However, the hitherto silent minority 
has increasingly resisted independence out-
side of parliament as well. In 2014 various 
organisations joined forces to found the 
Catalan Civil Society (Societat Civil Catalana, 
SCC) to give a voice not bound by party af-
filiation to those who advocate Catalonia 
remain part of Spain. 
Catalonia: Boycott Instead of 
Dialogue 
The separatists’ accusation that Madrid “ju-
dicialises” the Catalonia conflict thus re-
bounds on them. Moreover, the term is 
meant to distract from the fact that, in this 
conflict, the separatists are the ones who 
disregard democratic values as soon as the 
latter stand in the way of their goal, mean-
ing Catalonia’s secession. This is why their 
demands have neither the necessary “legal-
ity” nor – within the framework of a dem-
ocratic judicial system – the required polit-
ical “legitimacy”. 
This was also true of the preparation 
and execution of the 1 October 2017 refer-
endum on independence. It was only with 
the support of the CUP that Puigdemont’s 
government was able to pass a referendum 
law in early September, with a scant major-
ity in a single parliamentary session. Ac-
cording to Catalonia’s statute of autonomy, 
a quorum of at least two thirds should have 
been required (Statute of 19 July 2006, Arti-
cle 222). The result of the vote also seems 
questionable. It was neither checked nor 
confirmed by independent observers – nor 
were 90 percent of votes in favour enough 
to legitimise the declaration of independ-
ence on 10 October 2017 when voter turn-
out was only 42.3 percent. 
Whilst the three separatist parties insist 
that they are willing to engage in dialogue, 
they have in fact been dictating terms since 
the autumn of 2012: their concern is no 
longer to expand autonomy, but to estab-
lish the terms and conditions for secession. 
This was made clear by newly elected Re-
gional President Quim Torra in his parlia-
mentary address on 14 May. He and his al-
lies demand that central government en-
gage in a dialogue which would question 
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the constitutional order. However, the elec-
torate has not given Rajoy a mandate for 
this. Madrid can only offer the Catalan re-
gional government financial-reform negoti-
ations along with Spain’s 16 other autono-
mous communities; it did just that during 
the autonomous communities’ annual Con-
ference of Presidents (Sp. Conferencia de Presi-
dentes) in mid-January 2017. After long hard 
negotiations with the central government, 
the regions’ presidents decided on a “new 
model of regional financing” (El País, 17 Jan-
uary 2017). However, the premiers of Cata-
lonia and the Basque country, Carles 
Puigdemont und Íñigo Urkullu, refused to 
join the talks and boycotted the meeting. 
So far, the Catalan and Basque govern-
ments have also avoided cooperating with 
the parliamentary commission which is 
currently examining the Spanish autonomy 
system and drawing up proposals for re-
form. The first meeting of this so-called ter-
ritorial commission (Sp. comisión territorial) 
in mid-November 2017 took place without 
the 17 deputies of the Catalan separatists in 
the Spanish central parliament. It is still 
possible for the commission to reach the 
two-thirds majority required to drive a new 
financial order between Madrid and the re-
gions through the Spanish parliament. 
However, in situations as tense as this, 
party-political differences of opinion 
quickly have a negative effect. The Social-
ists thus view this project as their chance 
to establish a much more fundamental con-
stitutional reform while the governing Con-
servatives tend to curb such hopes. 
The commission experienced a setback 
in late March 2018, when Albert Rivera, the 
chairman of Cuidadanos, ended his party’s 
cooperation. He has accused the Socialists, 
who want to turn the Spanish nation into a 
“nation of nations” (Diario de Ibiza, 20 March 
2018), of making concessions to Catalan na-
tionalism. According to the Socialists, Cata-
lonia should be given nation status along-
side the Spanish nation. Rivera is concerned 
that this would divide Spaniards, a commu-
nity of shared political values, into groups 
differentiated along linguistic-cultural 
lines. It would indeed redefine the political 
concept of the nation as an ethnic-national-
ist one and further inflame the dispute over 
existing regional borders and the recogni-
tion of official languages (Riedel 2018, p. 7). 
Since the election of the hardliner Quim 
Torra, Cuitadanos, the Socialists (Span. Par-
tido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) and the 
ruling Spanish People’s Party (Span. Partido 
Popular, PP) have come closer together 
again. They promised to jointly protect the 
constitutional order of Spain and put the 
Catalan separatists in their place. It is there-
fore doubtful that Catalonia’s autonomy 
will come into force under the new regional 
government. They face a certain amount 
of pressure: according to recent surveys, 
Catalan voters are increasingly turning away 
from them. The defenders of the Spanish 
state will be able to reassure them only if 
they present convincing reforms of the au-
tonomous system. Their success depends 
very much on the Parliamentary Commis-
sion. 
Basque Self-Interest 
The work of the territorial commission 
has also been overshadowed by another 
conflict, namely the new federal budget for 
2018. Prime Minister Rajoy heads a minor-
ity government and must compromise. 
However, this year he can no longer depend 
on the support of the five deputies from 
the Basque Nationalist Party (Span. Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, PNV). They have declared 
their solidarity with the Catalan separatists 
and demand the reinstatement of the stat-
ute of autonomy (El Mundo, 2 April 2018). 
Only political concessions would make 
them change their minds. 
The Basques’ alignment with the de-
posed Catalan regional government is not 
one of solidarity in the sense of a political 
or economic link between the two regions. 
The Basques are mainly concerned with 
their own financial advantage, which might 
ultimately increase if they also follow the 
road to statehood in the slipstream of Cata-
lan separatism. In 2003 the then-Basque 
Premier Juan José Ibarretxe had already 
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submitted a political plan for making the 
Basque country an independent state. As 
a first step, the PNV demanded that the 
Basques be recognised as an independent 
nation (El País, 19 December 2003). Only 
three years later, the Catalans followed the 
same agenda by submitting a new statute 
of autonomy to the central government in 
which they described themselves as a sepa-
rate nation (Statute of 19 July 2006, Pream-
ble). This and other modifications later 
turned out to be unconstitutional. 
Barcelona also looks to the Basques for 
an example of financial self-administration. 
During the post-1975 democratisation pro-
cess, the Basque country and Navarre were 
able to secure privileges vis-à-vis the other 
regions. Their autonomy is based on cus-
tomary rights (fueros), which include finan-
cial and fiscal sovereignty. By contrast, the 
other autonomous communities first have 
to pay the tax revenue they have raised to 
the central state before they receive funds 
back as part of regional financial equalisa-
tion. This special status is the reason why 
the Basque and Catalan regional govern-
ments show scant interest in a countrywide 
reform project: they fear that any modifica-
tion of the asymmetrical autonomy system 
will leave them worse off than before. And 
yet federal models exist with win-win solu-
tions for all under the umbrella of a joint 
Spanish nation (Riedel 2016). 
European Solidarity, 
But with Whom? 
As a result, reforming the Spanish autonomy 
system is currently wishful thinking. And 
yet there is no reasonable alternative. If Cat-
alonia or the Basque country seceded, great 
economic harm would be caused to all. Ad-
vocates of secession like to minimise this 
problem. However, as the Brexit negotia-
tions demonstrate, an economic divorce can 
be far more expensive than initially de-
picted. And Brexit is “only” about the 
United Kingdom leaving the European in-
ternal market. In the case of Catalonia, an 
economic area that has coalesced over cen-
turies would be divided up. 
The close interlinking of Spain’s autono-
mous communities can be seen particularly 
in regional revenue sharing. Since the re-
gions have been unable to agree on a com-
mon reform, the 2009 system continues to 
be valid. Under this, half the tax revenues 
raised – for example from income tax and  
Illustration 1 
Payments from the liquidity fund of Spain’s 
autonomous regions (FLA) to Catalonia  
(2012–2017, in millions of euros) 
Source: author’s own compilation based on “Fondo de 
Liquidez Autonómica” [Regional liquidity fund], Wikipe-
dia, https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fondo_de_Liquidez_Auton 
%C3%B3mica; Los expertos urgen al Estado a cortar el grifo 
de liquidez a las comunidades [Experts call on the state to 
reduce the communities’ liquidity], in: El País, 3 February 
2018, https://elpais.com/economia/ 2018/02/03/actualidad/ 
1517679470_452325.html (both accessed 27 April 2018). 
 
VAT – flow back to the regions to fund 
public services, such as education, health 
and social-security systems. However, since 
the regions’ financial needs are far greater, 
they accrued debts with private lenders un-
til, in the crisis year of 2012, the financial 
markets shut down the money supply. 
Since then, the communities have borrowed 
the necessary financial resources at low in-
terest rates from central government. The 
total amount of loans has grown to about 
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232 billion euros in the past six years. Cata-
lonia’s share alone is 70.9 bn, representing 
30 percent of the total (El País, 17 February 
2018). This is a higher proportion than Cata-
lonia’s contribution to Spain’s gross domes-
tic product, which stands at 19 percent 
(IfW 2017, p. 15). Illustration 1 shows Cata-
lonia’s annual financial requirements from 
the regional liquidity fund (FLA), which is an 
estimated total of 9.4 bn euros for 2018. 
If Catalonia secedes, the new state would 
have a mountain of debt. Without national 
assistance, it would rely entirely on exter-
nal lenders. If the independence move-
ment’s plan was fulfilled, Catalonia would 
ideally obtain a special status enabling it 
to remain in the EU and receive loans from 
the ECB (Paluzie i Hernández 2015, p. 199). 
In other words, the separatists hope for 
both solidarity from the other EU members 
and a creative interpretation of the EU 
Treaty and the Maastricht criteria limiting 
government debt. 
Even if Catalonia could receive such Eu-
ropean support, a separation from Madrid 
would not be by mutual consent, but ac-
companied by disputes over the division of 
the pan-Spanish debt. If Catalonia refuses 
any debt obligations, as the former finance 
and economy minister Oriol Junqueras has 
already threatened, Spain’s government 
debt would increase from its current 100 
percent to 124 percent of gross domestic 
product. The modest successes of the auster-
ity policy during the past few years would 
be obliterated (Wirtschaftswoche, 9 September 
2017). To prevent a relapse into economic 
and financial crisis, salaries and social-secu-
rity benefits would need to be cut further. 
Ultimately, the European taxpayer would 
also be forced to shoulder the risks of new 
ECB loans. Then, if not before, the solidarity 
of EU citizens would be exhausted. Europe’s 
politicians should therefore make it clear to 
the Catalans that they bear a great responsi-
bility as members of the euro zone, and 
that they have a duty first and foremost to 
national solidarity, before they can expect 
solidarity from Europe. 
Further Reading 
Paluzie i Hernández, Elisenda, “Das Poten-
tial eines eigenständigen Kataloniens”, 
in: Die Übersetzung der Unabhängigkeit. Wie 
die Katalanen es erklären, wie wir es verstehen, 
ed. Krystyna Schreiber (Dresden, 2015), 
185–202. 
Riedel, Sabine, “Katalonien im Brennglas 
der EU-Krisen. Das Patt nach den Regio-
nalwahlen vom 21.12.2017 ist ein Signal 
an Europas Reformer”, Forschungshorizonte 
Politik & Kultur (online), January 2018. 
Riedel, Sabine, “Separatismus: Katalonien 
ist nur der Anfang… Steigendes Konflikt-
potential von Unabhängigkeitsbewegun-
gen in der Europäischen Union”, For-
schungshorizonte Politik & Kultur (online), 
August 2017. 
Riedel, Sabine, Föderalismus statt Separatismus. 
Politische Instrumente zur Lösung von Sezessi-
onskonflikten in Europa, SWP-Studie 
5/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 2016). 
Riedel, Sabine, Die Befragung zur Unabhängig-
keit Kataloniens (9.11.2014). Ergebnisse, Hin-
tergründe und Herausforderungen für Eu-
ropa, SWP-Arbeitspapier, Global Issues 
Division (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, November 2014). 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik, 2018 
All rights reserved 
This Comment reflects  
the author’s views. 
The online version of  
this publication contains 
functioning links to other  
SWP texts and other relevant 
sources. 
SWP Comments are subject  
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information on 
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP 
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ 
quality-management-for-
swp-publications/ 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und  
Politik 
German Institute for  
International and  
Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 
10719 Berlin 
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
Translation by Tom Genrich 
(Updated English version 
of SWP-Aktuell 25/2018) 
Prof. Dr. Sabine Riedel is a Senior Associate in the Global Issues Division at SWP. 
 
 
